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ABSTRACT
In the 2016 election year, the Senate refused to consider President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, maintaining
that no language in the Appointments Clause imposes an affirmative duty on the Senate to give any nominee a vote
and that the Senate’s power to refuse consent under that clause implies the authority to determine whether, and under
what political circumstances, actual consideration of a nominee should occur. This Article contends that the text of
Article II actually provides a surprising level of guidance in discerning the respective powers of President and Senate
in the appointment process. Specifically, it concludes that Article II, Section 2—both understood in whole and in
its parts—requires the Senate to consider a President’s nominees. It posits further that the Constitution’s language
implies some modest, but important, requirements for what Senate consideration must entail. Specifically, it observes
that settled understandings of the Senate’s rule-making authority require that the Senate provide a process by which
a President’s nominee could plausibly be confirmed. This Article will also examine how the Constitution’s original
framers, advocates and opponents understood the distribution of power between the branches set forth in the
Appointments Clause. By evaluating the instant constitutional problem with primary reference to a semantic analysis
of the text—and thereafter exploring the reliability of those conclusions with reference to original understandings of
that text—this Article’s interpretive framework conforms to the interpretive approach fervently preached by Justice
Scalia and usually praised by the leadership of the 114th Senate.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 2016 election year, the Senate refused to consider President
Obama’s nominee to replace Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. That
now stands as a successful claim of Senate authority over the appointment
process and an extraordinary partisan victory. To justify its refusal, the
Senate Judiciary Committee of the 114th Congress maintained that: (1) no
language in Article II, Section 2 imposes an affirmative duty on the Senate
to give any nominee a vote and (2) the Senate’s power to refuse consent
implies the authority to determine whether, and under what political
circumstances, actual consideration of a nominee should occur.1
Specifically, the committee maintained that the advice and consent
power endowed it with the constitutional authority to “withhold consent on
any nominee submitted by this President.”2 It further explained that no
nominee of President Obama’s would receive Senate consideration because
of the “circumstance” of the vacancy occurring during the presidential
election year.3 And, it promised to postpone consideration of any nominee
to ensure that “the American people [would] not [be] deprived of the
opportunity to engage in a full and robust debate over the type of jurist they
1

2
3

Letter from Hon. Charles E. Grassley, et al., Members of the United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, to Hon. Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader (Feb. 23, 2016) [hereinafter
Grassley Letter].
Id.
Id.
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wish to decide some of the most critical issues of our time.”4
The committee’s letter addressed far more than a dispute about the scope
of its duty in the event of an election year vacancy. There, the Senate
essentially claimed authority under the Appointments Clause5 to decline
consideration of any nominee of an individual President based on factors
such as (1) the Senate’s perception of the importance of the appointment or
(2) the political features of its timing. A Senate that claims those powers
captures the authority to indefinitely halt the appointment process, to shift
the appointment power to a subsequent President, and even to unilaterally
reduce the size of the Court upon the emergence of a vacancy. Moreover, a
Senate that claims the threshold power to decide who will be considered
functionally usurps part of the President’s nomination power itself.
The Senate’s remarkable and successful claim raises a multitude of urgent
questions. Will the new precedent persistently paralyze our nation’s ability
to fill judicial vacancies each time a vacancy occurs when the Senate and
Executive branch are respectively controlled by different parties? Will the
precedent be confined to vacancies occurring in the last year of a President’s
term? Or, will the Senate majority feel empowered to postpone all
consideration of a President’s nominees until the next election cycle to secure
the public’s input? Will the new precedent—anchored in the procedural
assumption that the appointment process is, at core, an exercise of factional
political power—undermine the public perception of the judicial branch as
a neutral arbiter of the rule of law? If the new precedent demonstrably
degrades the functionality and perceived legitimacy of the judiciary, does
societal respect for the rule of law suffer? If so, how does that bode for the
future cohesion of a culturally diverse and politically fractious society?
It could also be asserted that the questions are not so urgent. Is there
really any functional difference between a Senate that refuses to consider a
nominee and one that conducts a consideration process with no intent to ever
confirm? If so, are the questions in the preceding paragraph merely alarmist
hyperventilation by a faction that lacked sufficient political power to fill a
vacancy?
This Article will not purport to answer all of these questions. But none
of them can be coherently addressed without a threshold understanding of
what the United States Constitution requires of the Senate in the

4
5

Id.
In this Article, “the Appointments Clause” will refer to the entirety of the Constitution’s language
directing the process for appointment found in Article II, Section 2. References to the Nomination
Clause, the Advice and Consent Clause, and the Recess Appointments Clause describe subparts of
the Appointments Clause.
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appointment process. At minimum, if the Senate’s claim of authority over
that process is accepted as constitutionally plausible and therefore lawful, the
balance of power between the Senate and President in appointing Supreme
Court Justices will have profoundly changed.
Just two years before the 2016 nomination crisis, the United States
Supreme Court issued its opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning.6 There, the Court
resolved another dispute between the Senate and the President over their
respective roles in the appointment process. That case addressed the scope
of the President’s power to bypass the Senate’s advice and consent authority
under the Recess Appointments Clause.7 The Court observed that, when
determining “the allocation of power between two elected branches of
Government[,] . . . ‘[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration
of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions’
regulating the relationship between Congress and the President.”8 And, the
Court placed considerable emphasis on historical practice in resolving the
issues before it.
Perhaps for this reason, much of the contemporaneous political and
academic debate surrounding Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination centered
on the lessons of historical precedent.9 But, the relevant historical paradigm
can be characterized in a variety of ways.10 Robin Kar and Jason Mazzone
6
7
8
9

10

134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
Id. at 2556–57.
Id. at 2559 (third alteration in original) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)).
See, e.g., Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution
Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 53, 104 (2016); Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President
Announcing Judge Merrick Garland as his Nominee to the Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/16/remarks-presidentannouncing-judge-merrick-garland-his-nominee-supreme (noting recent history of divisiveness in
the nomination process but also noting the process resulted in confirmed appointees); Roberta
Rampton, Senator Grassley: ‘Standard Practice’ to Wait on Court Nominee, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2016, 7:37
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-scalia-grassley/senator-grassley-standard-practiceto-wait-on-court-nominee-idUSKCN0VN00C; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Senate Republicans, Merrick
Garland and the Lessons of History, HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (June 2, 2016, 09:53 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/the-senate-republicans-merrickgarland_b_10258520.html.
The appropriate use of historical gloss to resolve constitutional disputes, and the appropriate historical
precedents to consider in so doing, are not settled constitutional questions. See Curtis A. Bradley &
Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1–65 (comprehensively analyzing competing interpretive theories regarding the use
of historical gloss to resolve constitutional disputes between the branches). Indeed, commentators
have debated whether the appointment process for lower court federal judges could stand as precedent
for the Garland nomination, how far back analysis of Senate practice should extend, and which prior
appointment processes are the best analog. See Kar & Mazzone, supra note 9, at 73–82.
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conducted the most comprehensive analysis of historical practice and arrived
at persuasive and coherent conclusions. Nevertheless, even they conceded
that “it would . . . be irresponsible to conclude that the Senate Republicans’
current plan [to refuse to consider the President’s nominee] definitively
violates the Constitution . . . or does not violate the Constitution, given the
evidence and arguments presented [as to historical practice].”11 And, the
new historical precedent, now established by the Senate’s successful electionyear nullification of a President’s appointment power, has further muddled
the lessons of past appointment history.
Academic recourse to historical practice not only failed to provide
discernable constitutional boundaries after the death of Justice Scalia, it also
jumped the gun. That analysis too quickly assumed that the text of the
Constitution provided no useful guidance in evaluating the scope of the
Senate’s advice and consent power. This Article revisits that text. It aspires
to review comprehensively whether the Appointments Clause, and other
pertinent constitutional language, can be harmonized with the Senate’s claim
of authority. That review demonstrates that the text of Article II of the
Constitution provides a surprising level of guidance in discerning the
respective powers of the Senate and the President in the appointment
process. It concludes that Article II, Section 2, both understood in whole
and in its parts, requires the Senate to consider a President’s nominees. It
will posit further that the Constitution’s language implies some modest but
important requirements for what Senate consideration must entail.
Specifically, this Article will explain how the 114th Senate’s misreading
of its textual authority under the Advice and Consent Clause: (1)
compromises the President’s exclusive power to select nominees; (2)
contradicts the evident purpose of the Appointments Clause as conveyed by
its text (the mandatory and prompt appointment of important governmental
functionaries); (3) bypasses the Constitution’s express prescription for how
the size of the Court may be altered; (4) overlooks constitutional limitations
on the Senate’s rule-making authority; and (5) cripples one of the intended
constitutional checks on the Senate’s power over the appointment process.
The analysis will consider other features of the Constitution’s text relating
to appointments including the Recess Appointments Clause. It will address
the placement of the appointments clauses in Article II and the Constitution’s
express endowment of “the executive authority” to the Presidency within
that article. These features inform the scope of the Advice and Consent
Clause. They demonstrate that the clause cannot be harmonized with the

11

Kar & Mazzone, supra note 9, at 104.
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Senate’s claim that the phrase tacitly provides it with such dominant
authority over the appointment process.
The textual analysis that follows is consistent with the interpretive
framework adopted by the Court in Noel Canning. Although that opinion
resolved a set of distinct legal questions, it stands as the Court’s most recent
precedent addressing the respective powers of the President and the Senate
in the appointment process. Any complete analysis must account for how
the Supreme Court might assess the constitutional parameters of a selection
process for its own membership.12
Importantly, the Court’s reasoning in Noel Canning does not elevate
historical practice as the primary arbiter of disputed power. Rather, such
history carries “great weight” only when direct constitutional guidance is
found neither in the plain language of the Constitution, nor from the purpose
conveyed by that language.13 For this reason, a threshold focus on the
semantic meaning of pertinent constitutional text, the central project of this
Article, fully conforms to the Court’s most recent approach in evaluating
appointment disputes between the branches.14
To parallel further the Court’s interpretive framework in Noel Canning,
this Article will examine how the Constitution’s original framers, advocates,
and opponents understood the distribution of power between the branches
set forth in the Appointments Clause. Given the inherent challenges in

12

13

14

This Article does not address whether, or under what circumstances, a dispute regarding the powers
of the respective branches as to the appointment of Supreme Court justices would be justiciable.
However, one can conjure plausible scenarios that might make it so. If a President were to bypass
a recalcitrant Senate on the theory that the Senate had waived its constitutional opportunity to
provide advice and consent or if the President were to enforce his own process for securing Senate
consent in the absence of Senate action, the Court would be squarely faced with the decision of
whether to seat an appointee arising from such a process.
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (quoting Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690
(1929)); id. (quoting State ex rel. Town of Norwalk v. Town of South Norwalk, 58 A. 759, 761 (1904))
(observing that historical practice “is entitled to great regard” when constitutional phraseology is
“of doubtful meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S.
Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1264–65 (2015) (observing
the majority opinion in Noel Canning seemed to embrace the “proposition, emphasized by Justice
Scalia . . . that clear text is controlling, regardless of other considerations”).
In the event the question never reaches the Court, it will be left to the President, the Senate, and
the voters who elect both, to interpret the Advice and Consent Clause. But, given the Court’s
constitutional primacy as the final arbiter of such disputes, the Court’s decisional framework set
forth in Noel Canning should provide substantial guidance to the other branches and the public. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that it is the duty of the “judicial
department to say what the law is”); see also Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (adopting the Marbury
principle for separation-of-powers cases).
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deriving definitive constitutional meaning from such sources,15 that record is
presented as confirmatory of, rather than necessary to, the textual analysis.
The thrust of this inquiry, however, will confine itself to the semantic
meaning, context, and purpose conveyed by the words of the Constitution.16
To the extent the following textual analysis persuades, the resulting
conclusions must carry considerable weight under almost all prevailing
interpretive theories. Such theories either (1) posit the construction of text as
the only mode of understanding constitutional or statutory law that enforces
fidelity to democratic principles;17 (2) enshrine the text as the best evidence
of drafters’ intent;18 or (3) place the semantic meaning of the text at the apex
of a hierarchy of interpretive abstraction.19 Indeed, the dominant theories of
textual and constitutional interpretation diverge only when textual meaning
can be reasonably perceived as ambiguous.20 For this reason, inescapable
understandings of text can theoretically support strong claims: even claims of
near interpretive unanimity on disputed points of law.21

15

16

17
18

19

20
21

J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING
THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 46–59 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2012)
(summarizing the interpretive challenges and hazards of exclusive focus on the Framers’ intent).
As Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel observe, “[t]here is no canonical definition of textualism” and
this Article does not purport to debate the question. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13, at 1216 n.7.
In the Part of the Article devoted to considering the “plain meaning” of the text, the author has
strived to draw conclusions from the semantic meaning of the words, their context established by
the other words of the Constitution and any purposes conveyed exclusively by those words. The
author has relied on Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner’s specifications for the traditional
boundaries of textual fidelity as articulated in their book on the topic, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). Bradley & Siegel,
supra note 13, at 1281–82. That work is cited repeatedly during discussions of interpreting the text.
In so doing, the author does not necessarily endorse its claims about the appropriate tools for
resolving textual disputes when the text is ambiguous or subject to plausible competing
interpretations. The traditional tools for interpreting text include determining the purpose of a text
from its words and making structural observations about a document that informs those words: the
latter, in textualist nomenclature, is called “context.” These textual approaches should not be
confused with other modalities of constitutional construction that employ extra-textual evidence of
the Constitution’s purpose or structure in resolving constitutional disputes.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 9–28 (articulating textualist theory).
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 88 (2010);
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 29 (2014) (advocating robust purposivism in textual
interpretation that includes consideration of legislative history).
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 354 (1990) (advocating a pluralist approach to textual interpretation while
conceding that “the statutory text is the most authoritative interpretive criterion”).
BREYER, supra note 18, at 88.
But see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13, at 1214 (maintaining that “[t]he constraining effect of clear
text . . . is partially constructed by considerations that are commonly regarded as extratextual”).
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Lastly, the Article will explore some of the implications of its conclusion:
that the text of the Constitution requires the Senate to consider the
President’s nominees and provide a process for each nominee that could
reasonably result in filling the vacancy. And, it will explain why the
requirement of Senate consideration matters in practice—even if a
controlling Senate faction resolves to ultimately withhold consent from a
nominee before any consideration process has occurred.
I. LESSONS FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT: WHETHER THE
SENATE MUST CONSIDER A NOMINEE
After Justice Scalia’s death, the partisan stakes for filling the vacancy were
high. The political origin of the remaining justices was evenly divided
between the two parties.22 The appointee would therefore tip the perceived
ideological balance on the Court. Within the prior decade, the Court had
recently been called upon to resolve monumental and politically incendiary
issues. It had interpreted the First Amendment to prohibit common tools of
campaign-finance reform, affirmed most portions of the Affordable Care
Act, held for the first time that the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms
established a personal right, and that same-sex couples possessed a
constitutional right to marry.23 Three of those four cases it resolved by fiveto-four margins.24
Within an hour of Justice Scalia’s death, the Republican Senate Majority
Leader, Mitch McConnell, announced that the Senate would not allow
President Barack Obama, a Democrat, to replace him.25 Senate leadership
subsequently maintained that the Constitution imposed no requirement
upon it to consider President Obama’s nominee. Rather, it asserted that its
advice and consent role implied the authority to determine whether to
consider a nominee at all—and that it “fulfill[ed]” its role by “withholding
22

23

24
25

Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan were appointed by Democratic Presidents.
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts were appointed by Republican
Presidents. A List of the Justices of the Supreme Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Jan. 27, 2018),
https://apnews.com/bc9cfb3386884c7382bdc49f8116347b.
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015);
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2585; King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 316; Heller, 554
U.S. at 572.
Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement Under
Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 6:34 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitchmcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248 (quoting McConnell as saying,
“[T]his vacancy should not be filled until we have a new president”).
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[its] support for the nomination during a presidential election year.”26
Implicit in the Senate majority’s position were three tacit claims of power
over the appointment process: to delay indefinitely the appointment of
justices, to reduce unilaterally the size of the Court, and to shift the
nomination authority to a subsequent President. Indeed, the Senate applied
those claims in practice. The majority successfully delayed the appointment
process for two Supreme Court terms. It shifted the nomination power to a
President of its own party, Donald Trump, and secured the appointment of
Justice Neil Gorsuch, a perceived ideological conservative, to fill a vacancy
that had first occurred eleven months before the expiration of President
Obama’s term. And, when it appeared President Trump might not win the
fall election, important voices in the Senate Republican caucus suggested
that they would refuse to consider any nominee a President Hillary Clinton
might suggest—and thereby indefinitely reduce the Court’s size beyond the
year its inaction had already assured.27
The Senate majority embraced the notion that it had delayed the
appointment process for ideological reasons. It specifically argued that the
voters should have input at the ballot box precisely because of the expected
ideological effect of the new justice on the court. That rationale would make
little sense unless the criteria for judicial selection was ideological and
partisan, rather than presumptively focused on a nominee’s qualifications.28
26

27

28

Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Grassley Statement
on the President’s Nomination of Merrick Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statement-presidents-nominationmerrick-garland-us-supreme-court; see also Grassley Letter, supra note 1; Press Release, Orrin Hatch,
U.S. Senator, Hatch Statement on the Nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court (Mar.
16, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/hatch-statement-on-thenomination-of-merrick-garland-to-the-supreme-court (characterizing the withholding of
consideration as itself the “exercise” of the Senate’s “advice-and-consent power”); Press Release,
Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, Hatch: “Democrats are Peddling False Claims about the Constitution
and the Supreme Court Vacancy” (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/2016/4/hatch-democrats-are-peddling-false-claims-about-the-constitution-and-thesupreme-court-vacancy (quoting from an earlier speech that “Advice and consent begins with a
judgment about the best way to exercise [the Senate’s] power in each situation.”).
David A. Graham, What Happens if Republicans Refuse to Replace Scalia?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/whats-the-opposite-of-courtpacking/506081/ (quoting Republican Senators Burr, Cruz, and McCain who each stated
separately that they would block any Clinton nominee, and discussing claims by conservative
commentators of constitutional right to leave position vacant).
Amita Kelly, McConnell: Blocking Supreme Court Nomination ‘About a Principle, Not a Person’, NPR (Mar.
16, 2016, 12:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/16/470664561/mcconnell-blockingsupreme-court-nomination-about-a-principle-not-a-person (reporting responses of various
Senators to the nomination of Merrick Garland expressing Republican consensus that no nominee
should be considered until after the election. Senator McConnell: “Let’s let the American People
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By that standard, the delay resulted in a remarkable partisan triumph for the
Republican Party. With the election of President Trump, the pending
vacancy, and the age of several sitting justices, the Republican Party was
positioned to secure ideological control of the Court for another generation.29
But how does one evaluate that political victory through non-partisan
lenses? Did it represent a legitimate assertion of political authority earned at
the ballot box and contemplated by the Constitution? Or did the Senate’s
unprecedented claim of authority over the appointment process defeat the
Constitution’s intended design for the distribution of power between the
branches? If so, was it ultimately a defeat for the rule of law and the civil
society it fosters?
The only constitutional language that squarely addresses the
appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is found in Article II, Section 2, and
includes both the Appointments Clause and that clause’s component, the
Recess Appointments Clause. Those clauses read as follows:
The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court . . . .
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session.30

As shall be explained, that language cannot be harmonized with the Senate’s
claim that it may lawfully refuse to consider a President’s nominee.
A. Vacancies to Be Filled Mandatorily and Promptly
The Appointments Clause contains three operative parts: (1) the
President “shall nominate,” (2) he then “shall appoint,” and (3) the latter
action must occur “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” In
context then, the Senate’s advice and consent role is the second step of a
three-part process: nomination, Senate consideration, and appointment.31
All three steps are necessary for a vacancy to be filled.

29

30
31

decide.” Senator Grassley: supporting refusal to consider any candidate until after the election
because “[a] lifetime appointment . . . could dramatically impact individual freedoms and change
the direction of the court for at least a generation.” Senator Cornyn: “The next justice could change
the ideological makeup of the Court for a generation . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: What Will the Presidential Election Mean for SCOTUS?, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 6,
2016,
8:45
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemerinsky_what_will_the_coming_election_mean_for_scotus/.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 167 (“Context is a primary determinant of meaning. . . .
The entirety of [the pertinent text] thus provides the context for each of its parts.”).
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Crucially, the clause sets forth the beginning and ending steps of that
process in mandatory terms: the President “shall” nominate and the
President “shall” appoint. The text thus describes the Senate’s consideration
of a President’s nominee as a necessary step occurring within a mandatory
process. This directive, that the appointment process is mandatory, textually
demonstrates the purpose of the clause: completed appointments. Put
another way, the text of the clause, when read in its entirety, implies that
Senate consideration is necessary for the clause to fulfill its purpose: the
staffing of specified, important governmental positions.
In short, the clause’s mandatory language, read in the context of its
evident purpose, describes a process for filling vacancies that is logically
obligatory on both the President and the Senate. Indeed, the Constitution
uses the words “with” and “by” to preface the Senate’s role of consideration:
these are words of connection and derivation respectively.
They
linguistically wed the Senate’s role to the President’s expressly obligatory one.
The language immediately subsequent in the text, the Recess
Appointments Clause, corroborates this construction.
That clause
authorizes the President to bypass Senate consideration altogether when the
Senate lacks the institutional ability to provide it. Under that clause, when
the two competing directives of prompt appointment and Senate
consideration collide, the Constitution gives primacy to prompt
appointment: an unambiguous textual elevation of governmental
functionality over “checks and balances.” The Supreme Court has itself
adopted this function-based reading of the Recess Appointments Clause. In
Noel Canning, the majority observed that the purpose of that clause is to allow
the President to “ensure the continued functioning of the Federal
Government.”32
To be sure, nothing in the Recess Appointments Clause itself commands
urgent consideration when a candidate is nominated during a Senate session.
And, the Senate is presumably empowered to balance the importance of
filling vacancies against the quality of the President’s individual nominees in
light of the time remaining before recess. But the Recess Appointments
Clause does place a limit on the Senate’s power to impair the President’s
mandate to staff the government—and it textually undermines any claim that
the Senate is tacitly empowered to delay that process by postponing
consideration beyond a recess.

32

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014).
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Thus, the Senate’s specific claim here—that it possessed the
constitutional authority to indefinitely disable the appointment process by
declining to consider a President’s nominee—cannot be harmonized with
either the mandatory language within the Appointments Clause (which
obliges the Senate to perform its advice and consent role) or the purpose
conveyed by both pertinent clauses read together (that those important
government positions itemized in Article II, Section 2 be promptly filled). If,
as the text of Article II semantically provides, the appointment process is a
mandatory one that should not be delayed even by Senate recess, it would
be illogical to construe that text as granting the Senate power to unilaterally
postpone that process indefinitely.
Indeed, if the Senate need not consider an individual nominee or, as
claimed by the 114th Senate, consider any nominee of a particular President,
then the Senate will have secured functional control over both the timing of
appointments and whether certain vacancies are ever filled. But, as
discussed, the appointments clauses set forth in Article II, Section 2 endorse
functionality. Neither clause suggests that the Senate should be empowered
to control the timing of when vacancies would be filled. To the extent
Article II gives either branch control over timing, it gives it to the President.
The text expressly provides the President with the exclusive power of
nomination and therefore the authority to initiate the process.
Nonetheless, several constitutional scholars have maintained that
congressional power to determine the size of the Supreme Court implies
Senate authority to decline consideration of the President’s nominee.33 If the
Senate is empowered to reduce the size of the Court through legislation, they
reason, it surely crosses no constitutional boundary when it achieves the same
result through legislative inaction.
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See Noah Feldman, Obama and Republicans Are Both Wrong About Constitution, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17,
2016, 12:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-17/obama-and-senate-areboth-wrong-about-the-constitution (arguing that the refusal to consider nominee and leave a position
vacant is not a constitutional violation because Congress has control of the size of the Court); see also
Johnathan Adler, The Erroneous Argument the Senate Has a ‘Constitutional Duty’ to Consider a Supreme Court
Nominee,
WASH.
POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Mar.
15,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/15/the-erroneousargument-the-senate-has-a-constitutional-duty-to-consider-a-supreme-court-nominee/
(quoting
Noah Feldman to argue that the refusal to consider a nominee and leave a position vacant does not
violate the Constitution); Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn’t Have to Act on Merrick Garland’s
Nomination, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/
senate-obama-merric-garland-supreme-court-nominee/482733/ (making the same argument in the
context of explaining why the Senate has no affirmative duty to act on a Supreme Court nominee).
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This argument overlooks that the Senate is not unilaterally empowered to
reduce the size of the Court. Congress must do so through the legislative
process, “by Law,” as Article II, Section 2 requires. Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution provides that: “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States . . . .”34 Thus, a constitutionally
permissive reduction of the Court would require the assent of two political
bodies other than the Senate including, importantly here, the President.
The Constitution’s design for determining the size of the Court
underscores why its text cannot be interpreted as empowering the Senate to
refuse to consider a specific President’s nominees. If the Advice and Consent
Clause could be construed to grant the Senate the power to leave a vacancy
unfilled indefinitely, it would empower the Senate to achieve unilaterally
results that the Constitution specifies must occur jointly through the
legislative process. And, no language in the Constitution suggests the Senate
may so bypass the legislative process to change the size of the Court. Rather,
the Constitution describes a legislative process calibrated to include the
checks and balances inherent in the participation of the House and the
President. Thus, the Advice and Consent Clause cannot be read to provide
the Senate a power that would so undermine the legislative process expressly
prescribed for determining court size.35
Vikram Amar and several other constitutional commentators have
contended that Article II articulates no textual duty on the Senate to act on a
Presidential nomination.36 Specifically, Amar asserts that “[t]he text of the
Constitution certainly does not use any language suggesting the Senate has a
legal obligation to do anything.”37 In so concluding, he correctly observes
that the Appointments Clause does not attach the word “shall” to the Senate’s
advice and consent role.38 But Amar overlooks that using “shall” to describe
the Senate’s role would have been linguistically confusing because one part of
that role, the provision of consent, is semantically not obligatory on the
Senate. And, as discussed, the language plainly describes the Senate’s role as

34
35

36

37
38

U.S. CONST. art I, § 7.
Feldman, supra note 33. In his commentary, Professor Feldman suggests that this constraint on
Senate authority over the size of the Court would be “highly formalistic.” Id. But, it is a species of
formalism that the Constitution expressly requires.
Vikram David Amar, The Grave Risks of the Senate Republicans’ Stated Refusal to Process Any Supreme Court
Nominee
President
Obama
Sends
Them,
VERDICT
(Feb.
26,
2016)
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/02/26; Feldman, supra note 33; Ramsey, supra note 33.
Amar, supra note 36.
Id.
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an indispensable second step to an unambiguously mandatory process.
Nor can it be correctly argued that, in the context of Article II, “shall”
denotes a discretionary act.39 Article II, Section 1, devoted to the procedures
by which a President takes and leaves office, uses the word “shall” 25 times.
In each case, it denotes an obligatory procedural step or event. For example,
that section uses the word “shall” to describe the indispensable duty of the
President to take the oath of office: “Before he enter on the Execution of his
Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation . . . .”40
In yet tighter context, Article II, Section 2 prefaces the President’s
itemized powers in three different ways. That section does not state that the
President “shall” make treaties. It does not state that the President “shall”
appoint during a recess nor does it state the President “shall” grant reprieves
and pardons. Rather, it states that he “shall have Power” to do these things.
Elsewhere, that section uses the word “may” to describe (1) the President’s
entitlement to receive opinions from his executive departments and (2) the
Senate’s authority to delegate appointment authority to inferior officers or
department heads.41
Thus, the Constitution calibrates the level of presidential duty attached
to each of the individual powers set forth in Article II, Section 2. In so doing,
it specifies whether the exercise of each power is discretionary or obligatory.42
By twice using the word “shall” in the Appointments Clause, the
constitutional text articulates that the President’s twin duties of nomination
and appointment are obligatory, not discretionary. Such a textual choice
demonstrates the Constitution commands important vacancies be filled. It
thereby implicitly suggests that doing so is necessary for the functioning of
government itself. In this context, the Senate’s advice and consent role is
semantically triggered by the President’s obligatory act of nominating a judge
and is necessary for the subsequent obligatory act of appointing the nominee.

39

40
41
42

In A Fragment on Shall and May, Nora Rotter Tillman and Seth Barrett Tillman contend that the
terms “will” and “shall” may have had different uses at the time of the Constitution’s drafting than
those accepted today. 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 453, 455–56 (2010) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl. 8). Specifically, they suggest that in 1787 “shall” was sometimes used to indicate futurity and
“will” to instead indicate emphatic tense. Id. at 455. But the example they provide, the Oath
Clause in Article II, Section 1, plainly uses “shall” to denote obligation and “will” to indicate
futurity: “Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or
Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President
of the United States . . . .’” Id. at 456 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added)).
U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
Feldman, supra note 33. This context for the use of “shall” in Article II, Section 2 contradicts
Professor Feldman’s suggestion that the “shall” in the Appointments Clause nonetheless “confers
some discretion on the executive.” Id.
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As such, the Senate’s role can only be understood as a procedural obligation.
No other reading is functionally plausible or consistent with the intent
conveyed by the words of the Appointments Clause.
B. Refusal of Consideration Distinguished from Refusal of Consent
To be sure, the Senate possesses an express textual power to refuse
consent. That power, if deployed methodically after consideration, could
equally obstruct the appointment of important government officers. Could
it not be argued, then, that the Framers understood they were empowering
the Senate to so obstruct the filling of vacancies?
Not in the same way. The Senate’s refusal of consent, in contrast to
withholding consideration, does not itself halt the mandatory process
established to fill important vacancies. This is because the President retains
the power to nominate sequentially other candidates who are, in turn,
entitled to Senate consideration.43 Serial nomination—when consideration
is assumed—provides a check on the Senate’s power by deterring it from
unreasonably withholding consent to a President’s first nominee. After all,
they might find the second nominee less appealing than the first. For
example, had the 114th Senate commenced consideration of Judge Garland,
it may have ultimately been encouraged to grant consent given that no other
nominee would likely be either so advanced in age or ideologically moderate
in profile.44 By contrast, the Senate’s refusal to consider any nominee of a
given President utterly disables the process: a process that the two controlling
clauses articulate as both mandatory and urgent.
Furthermore, the Senate’s potential refusal of consent, unlike the refusal
of consideration, is expressly contemplated as part of the mandatory process
set forth in the Appointments Clause. Indeed, withholding consent completes
the first two of the steps envisioned by the clause: the President’s exercise of
the nomination power has occurred and the Senate has considered the
nominee. The Senate’s power to withhold consent is implicit in the words of
the Constitution: the Senate’s authority to withhold consideration is
contradicted by the semantic meaning of the same words. To those

43

44

As shall be discussed below, that is precisely how the Framers envisioned that the process would
function in practice. See infra notes 45–46. But, this Part confines itself to arguments based
exclusively on text.
See Eliza Collins, Flake is Ready to Move Forward with Garland’s Nomination, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2016,
9:31 AM), https://usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/10/21/report-flakeready-move-forward-garlands-nomination/92506676/ (reporting that Republican Senator Flake
suggested that the Senate “move forward” with hearings for fear that Hillary Clinton would appoint
a less-moderate justice).
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committed to abiding by procedural law as expressed by constitutional text,
that difference is crucial.
C. The President’s Exclusive Power to Nominate Is Illusory Absent Senate
Consideration
The Appointments Clause also provides guidance when considered in its
individual parts. As Justice Scalia explained in his treatise on statutory
interpretation, courts should construe legal texts to render every part
operative.45 In effect, this rule “holds that it is no more the court’s function
to revise by subtraction than by addition.”46 To avoid this risk, no part of a
legal text should be “given an interpretation that causes it . . . to have no
consequence.”47 In conformity with this bedrock principle of both textual
interpretation and logical communication, the Appointments Clause should
not be construed so as to render any part of its language ineffectual.
That clause provides that the President “shall nominate.” Semantically,
that power is exclusive to the President. Further, its context identifies it as a
non-trivial executive prerogative. The Appointments Clause is found in
Article II, Section 2, the paragraph of the Constitution devoted to itemizing
the powers of the President. No parallel nomination or appointment
authority is found in Article I, Section 8, which sets forth the powers of the
Senate. Nor was it placed in the more neutral territory of Article III. And,
Article II begins by stating that the President is endowed with “the executive
power.” This structure and placement together suggest that the Constitution
has categorized those powers itemized in Article II, Section 2 as primarily
executive functions.48

45
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SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 174–75.
Id. at 174.
Id. This canon of interpretation was well understood in the founding era. In later considering
whether the Appointments Clause provided the President or the Senate with the power of removing
non-judicial officers, George Mason, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, observed to
James Monroe that “it is a well known Rule of Construction, that no Clause or Expression shall be
deemed superfluous or nugatory, which is capable of a fair and rational Meaning.” Letter from
George Mason to James Monroe (Jan. 30, 1792), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725–
1972: 1787–1792, at 1254, 1255 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).
The Author recognizes that this can be characterized as a species of structural argument rather
than as a textual argument. However, all textual interpretation theories elevate the importance of
context in interpreting text. Thus, the more broadly one defines context, the more an argument
can be construed as one of structure. However, the argument here confines itself to the context
provided by the other words of the Constitution itself—not more general and debatable arguments
about the Founders’ goals in generating a new Constitution.
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Understood properly, then, Article II expressly endows the President with
the broad power over executive functions. Indeed, most of the governmental
posts identified in the appointments clauses are employed in executive
departments: departments which the President is given express power to
direct. This structure implicitly identifies the selection of such officials as,
fundamentally, an executive function.49 The unqualified nature of the
President’s nomination power thus conforms to the context of Article II.
Furthermore, the President’s authority to nominate finds its place alongside
the clauses providing the President power to act as Commander in Chief, to
direct the executive departments, to “grant reprieves and Pardons,” and to
make treaties.50 Each represents a substantial grant of authority to the
executive branch.
The President’s exclusive power to nominate, read together with the
exclusive, but qualified, power to appoint, signals a broader textual design to
primarily empower the President to select Supreme Court justices.
Conversely, the Senate’s power to withhold consent, but not nominate or
appoint, sounds in veto, not selection. Understood in its context, placed
among important executive powers, the Senate’s advice and consent role
must be construed as creating a check on an appointment power otherwise
defined as executive in nature.
Yet, the President’s power to name a candidate would be a comparatively
trivial one, hardly worthy of such prominent textual emphasis, if it did not
include the power to have the candidate considered. Nomination without
consideration is a futile act. Conversely, a Senate that claims the authority
to withhold consideration of a nominee has captured concurrent authority to
decide who will be considered. A Senate empowered to decline consideration
of a nominee would functionally share the power of nomination itself.
Thus, one cannot construe the Senate’s advice and consent authority to
imply the additional power to withhold consideration without compromising
the President’s unique textual authority to nominate. Such a construction
would render the Nominations Clause, which reads as an exclusive executive
power, mystifyingly inarticulate. Put another way, the claim that the Senate’s
consent authority tacitly includes the power to refuse consideration altogether
cannot be harmonized with the express constitutional language endowing the
President with the exclusive power to nominate.

49
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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .”).
Id.
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D. No Text Articulates or Implies Any Senate Authority to Refuse Consideration
Just as neutral principles of textual interpretation require giving each
operative word effect, they also forbid adding language that the authors did
not include.51 If the Constitution had been framed to convey that the Senate
would be granted concurrent control over who would receive consideration,
very different words would have been used to describe such a process.
The words “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, [the
President] shall appoint” would be wholly inadequate to convey any Senate
authority to refuse to consider a nominee. Those words semantically modify
the President’s appointment power, not his nomination power. For this
reason, the Senate’s power to provide advice and refuse consent does not
textually include any power to determine whom the President can nominate.
Nor does that phrase endow the Senate with authority over which President
may nominate a judge or the political circumstances under which a President
may do so. Textually, the phrase describes only the authority to grant or
withhold consent to the appointment of an already nominated candidate. It does
not articulate unilateral Senate authority to determine the size of the court
or to control the timing of the appointment process. It certainly does not
describe any power to add a substantial fourth step to the three-step process
of nomination, consideration, and appointment—such as the consideration
of the nominee by the public in an intervening presidential election.
To be sure, a founding era political theorist might argue that the
legislative branch should retain all of these powers and, as will be seen,
several delegates to the Constitutional Convention made arguments that the
legislature should dominate the appointment process. But the words chosen
at that Convention do not themselves imply, much less articulate, any such
Senate authority. As explained above, the placement of the Appointments
Clause in Article II, Section 2 among the list of the President’s specified
powers instead of in Article I—or more neutrally in Article III—contradicts
any notion that the Senate enjoys an unarticulated power to dominate the
appointment process arising from its advice and consent role.
Far from providing textual support for inaction, the Advice and Consent
Clause defines the lone Senate role in the appointment process as the essence
of consideration. By definition and logic, both advice and consent are
themselves acts of consideration. The Senate cannot provide advice regarding
a candidate for appointment without participating in the consideration of that
candidate. Similarly, the Senate cannot withhold or provide consent without
considering a nominee. Thus, the 114th Senate claimed a power to withhold
51

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 93.
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consideration from words that describe only the provision of it. It claimed a
power of inaction from text that describes only action.
E. Neither Constitutional Silence Nor Senate Rule-Making Power Authorizes Inaction
At the outset of the debate between President Obama and the Senate
regarding the process for filling the vacancy, Professor Ilya Somin presented
the thrust of the Senate’s textual claim in a commentary published by The
Washington Post.52 Specifically, he observed that the Appointments Clause is
silent on the “specific procedure by which the Senate can refuse its
consent.”53 Somin further observed that Article I, Section 5 affirmatively
endows the Senate with the power to “determine the rules of its proceedings,”
a power that, in his view, necessarily included the power to refuse
consideration altogether.54 From this, he concluded that Article II, Section 2
“does not indicate whether it must do so by taking a vote, or whether it can
simply refuse to consider the President’s nominee at all.”55 Senator Orrin
Hatch echoed this theory when he maintained in defense of his caucus that
“the Constitution [does not] require the Senate to hold a hearing on a
nominee, or even to take any action at all.”56
In essence, Somin’s textual construction is based in equal part on express
Senate rule-making authority and on an inference from constitutional
silence. But the text of Article II renders both arguments unpersuasive.
The Senate’s rule-making authority, the power to design its own
deliberative procedure, does not operate independently of other
constitutional mandates. Like all other constitutional provisions, its scope
must be understood in harmony with the document as a whole.57 Article I,
52
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Ilya Somin, The Constitution Does Not Require the Senate to Give Judicial Nominees an Up or Down Vote,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/17/the-constitution-does-not-require-the-senate-to-givejudicial-nominees-an-up-or-down-vote/.
Id.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2). Michael Ramsey also urged a species of this argument
in his debate with Erwin Chemerinsky at the National Constitution Center. See We the People: Does
the Senate Have a Duty to Hold Hearings for Supreme Court Nominees?, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR. (Apr.
7,
2016),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/podcast-does-the-senate-have-a-duty-to-holdhearings-for-supreme-court-nomi (arguing that the language in Article I, Section 5 of the United
States Constitution gives the Senate the power to “determine the rules of its proceedings,” and
allows the Senate to deny consent to a Supreme Court nominee by refusing to hold a hearing).
Somin, supra note 52.
Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, Senate Should Not Hold Hearings for Obama SCOTUS
Nominee (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/sen-orrinhatch-senate-should-not-hold-hearings-for-obama-scotus-nominee.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 167–69 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
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Section 5 does not authorize the Senate, by setting its own parliamentary
rules, to take otherwise unconstitutional acts or contradict plain
constitutional directive.
The Supreme Court itself has emphasized this limitation on Senate rulemaking authority in the context of appointments. In Noel Canning, the Court
acknowledged the power of the Senate to determine the length of its own
sessions, but also observed:
The Constitution explicitly empowers the Senate to “determine the Rules of
its Proceedings.” And we have held that “all matters of method are open to
the determination” of the Senate, as long as there is “a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained” and the rule does not “ignore
constitutional restraints . . . .”58

Somin overlooks both of these limitations on Senate rule-making authority.
Senate procedure must bear a reasonable relation to the result that the
procedure facilitates. Here, the “result . . . sought to be attained” must be
the Senate’s performance of its textual mandate to provide timely advice and
consent on a President’s nominee and to facilitate the Constitution’s purpose
of staffing important government posts.59 The Senate cannot claim that it
reasonably pursues those constitutional purposes when it utterly refuses to
activate any process, much less those set forth in its own rules, for evaluating
nominees.
Nor can Senate rule-making authority “ignore constitutional restraints.”
For example, the phrase immediately preceding the Appointments Clause
in Article II, Section 2 provides that the President has the power to make
treaties “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds
of the Senators . . . concur.”60 The Senate could not determine instead,
based on its rule-making power, that it would hereafter take three-quarters
of the Senators to concur. The Senate’s general authority over its own
internal procedures is thus subordinate to other, more specific, constitutional
text that circumscribes the Senate’s rule-making authority in the context of
ratifying treaties.61 Nor could the Senate claim constitutional sanction under
its rule-making authority to thwart the President’s power to “convene” the
Senate—even though parliamentary rules for gathering Senate members are

58
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60
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316, 406 (1819)).
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014) (internal citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)).
Id.
U.S. CONST. ART II, § 2.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 180–88 (explaining that when two provisions of the same
statutory scheme facially conflict, they are to be read in harmony and the more-specific provision
controls over the general).
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generally governed by the Senate’s rules. In short, Senate rule-making
authority is necessarily subordinate to, and must be exercised in accordance
with, express constitutional directive. Thus, to the extent a persuasive case
has been made that the constitutional text demonstrates a requirement that
(1) consideration of nominees occur; (2) in a reasonably prompt fashion; and
(3) with a purpose of filling vacancies to facilitate governmental function, the
mere existence of Senate rule-making authority provides no entitlement to
disregard that mandate.
Somin’s second suggestion—that Article II is silent on the question of
Senate consideration—simply mischaracterizes that text. As explained
above, Article II semantically imposes on the Senate a duty to perform its
advice and consent role. To review, that text gives the President the exclusive
power to nominate: an illusory power if it does not trigger Senate
consideration of the nominee. And, the text sets forth a mandatory process,
which must necessarily include Senate consideration, to promptly fill
important governmental posts.
Furthermore, as discussed, a fundamental canon of textual
interpretation, endorsed by Justice Scalia, forbids adding language that the
authors did not provide. If the Appointments Clause had been crafted to
empower the Senate to disregard a President’s nominees in contradiction of
apparent goals reflected in its language, it would not have conveyed such a
counterweight with textual silence. As discussed, had the Constitution been
crafted to convey that the President and Senate essentially shared the power
of nomination, the Appointments Clause would not have been placed
exclusively in Article II, among the list of Presidential powers and the phrase
“he shall nominate” would have been qualified.
Contrary to Somin’s suggestion, then, the relevant text is far from
indifferent as to whether the Senate must consider a President’s nominees.
Rather, the Constitution’s silence is dispositive only in providing no support
for the Senate’s novel claim of dominant authority over the appointment
process. And, although Article I, Section 5 authorizes the Senate to employ
its own parliamentary process once the President has selected a nominee, the
text of Article II requires that the process be designed to fulfill the Senate’s
constitutional role in appointment. Withholding consideration altogether,
the functional equivalent of withholding discharge of its obligatory
constitutional role, contradicts that directive.
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II. WHAT CONSIDERATION MUST ENTAIL
A. Conclusions from the Text Alone
Based on the text and context in Article II, then, “advice and consent” is
an obligatory process that requires the Senate to consider a President’s
individual nominees. But what must that consideration involve? Although
the Constitution specifies no particular process beyond an expectation that
advice and consent occur, its text does provide guidance on what
consideration must entail.
Article I, Section 5 endows the Senate with the authority to “determine
the Rules of its Proceedings.”62 As explained above, the Senate’s
constitutional entitlement to adopt its own rules of procedure does not relieve
the Senate of complying with its duty to provide advice and consent.
Importantly here, however, those limits on rule-making authority also
impose some general, but meaningful, constraints on the procedural features
of consideration itself.
To review, the Senate’s rules are textually subordinate to the more
specific directives of the Constitution.63 Indeed, in Noel Canning, our Supreme
Court required “a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the [constitutional] result which is
sought to be attained.”64 Therefore, any specific procedures promulgated by
the Senate for the conduct of “advice and consent” must enable it to perform
the constitutional duties set forth in the Appointments Clause. As discussed
above, the repeated obligatory language within that clause, considered
together with its recess-appointment provision, demonstrates a textual
requirement that important government vacancies be filled in a reasonably
prompt fashion. At minimum, then, any Senate procedure for providing
advice and consent must be designed to timely facilitate the potential
confirmation of a nominee. Put another way, the Senate has an affirmative
constitutional duty to provide a process by which a nominee will receive consideration, and
through which an appointment can plausibly occur. Because any appointment could
only occur through the consent of the Senate, that process must include some
avenue by which the Senate, as a body, could eventually express its consent
to confirm a nominee within a reasonable time frame.

62
63
64

U.S. CONST. art. I, §5.
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)).
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The text of the Appointments Clause also sets forth some implicit
constraints on that process. As previously observed, the text describing the
Senate’s powers in the appointment process, the Advice and Consent Clause,
limits only the President’s power of appointment—not the power of
nomination. Specifically, the Senate’s role is textually and semantically
confined to providing advice and consent as to an already-nominated
candidate. Nothing in the text of Article II, Section 2 provides either the
President or the Senate the discretion to determine, as a threshold matter,
whether nomination or consideration will occur based on their views of
optimal political timing or ideological advantage. Rather it specifies that the
President “shall nominate” and, thereafter, that the President “shall appoint”
in a timely manner.
For these reasons, the Appointments Clause does not provide the Senate
with the threshold authority to determine whether, and under what political
circumstances, it will consider a President’s nominee. When the leadership
of the 114th Senate maintained that it would consider no nominees of
President Obama until after the voters had spoken in the 2016 presidential
election, it may have been presenting a politically palatable and ultimately
successful rationale. But it was not articulating a constitutionally correct
basis for refusing to consider a lawfully nominated candidate for the United
States Supreme Court. Instead, it was asserting a power over the
appointment process that the Constitution plainly did not provide it.
B. Extra-Textual Sources of Constitutional Guidance
The text provides only general guidance and leaves important procedural
questions unanswered. For example, does the mandate—that the Senate
provide some procedure that facilitates the timely confirmation of an
individual nominee—require a vote from the full Senate on every nominee?
Arguably, a constitutionally compliant procedure need only potentially result
in such a vote. Nor does the text itself confine individual Senators to any
particular criteria once they actually consider a particular nominee. If the
constitutional text provides only general standards for what consideration
must entail, does the Senate necessarily possess unlimited discretion to shape
procedure within those broad confines? Or, are there additional
constitutional constraints on the Senate process arising from other
approaches to interpreting the Appointments Clause?
In Noel Canning, the Court held that, when express constitutional text
provides ambiguous direction, or no direction, “‘[l]ong settled and
established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions’ regulating the relationship
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between Congress and the President.”65 In fact, it resolved several
procedural disputes arising from the Recess Appointments Clause largely on
that basis.66 It further suggested that a practice “of at least twenty years
duration” might be considered “[l]ong settled and established.”67
In addressing whether the Senate could constitutionally withhold
consideration of Judge Garland on grounds that the vacancy arose in the last
year of a President’s term, Robin Kar and Jason Mazzone have conducted a
comprehensive analysis of historical practice to answer that distinct
question.68 Although this Article contends that such an approach was not
necessary given the express guidance provided in the Constitution, historical
practice could be marshalled to address procedural questions for which the
Constitution truly provides no direction. Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel have
explored some of the analytical challenges in divining the appropriate
application of the “historical practice” interpretive gloss.69 A nuanced review
of the Senate’s historical practice in considering presidential nominees,
which comprehensively addresses those analytical challenges, is beyond the
scope of this thesis (which focuses on the lessons of constitutional text). But,
in light of the Court’s reasoning in Noel Canning, such a review could
conceivably provide the Senate additional, more specific, direction on what
a constitutionally compliant advice and consent process must include.
Because such an inquiry becomes relevant only in answering procedural
questions left unresolved by the text of the Constitution, any insights from
the Senate’s historical practice in discharging its advice and consent role
could not undermine the minimum requirements for that practice arising
from the words of Article II, Section 2, as identified above.
Theoretically, founding-era understandings of Article II, Section 2 can
also provide an extra-textual source of constitutional guidance. Although the
interpretive value of such evidence is a matter of fierce academic dispute,70
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Noel Canning marshalled such
understandings of the Recess Appointments Clause in resolving disputed
appointment power.71 Furthermore, the leadership of the Senate majority,
65
66

67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 2559 (alteration in original) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)).
Id. at 2568–69 (using lessons of historical practice to resolve meaning of “vacancies that may
happen”); id. at 2562–67 (following the same practice to determine the definition of “recess”); id. at
2566–67 (following the same practice to determine the length of actionable recess).
Id. at 2559 (second alteration in original) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 689, 690).
Kar & Mazzone, supra note 9, at 104.
See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 13 (analyzing, comprehensively, competing interpretive
theories regarding the use of historical gloss to resolve constitutional disputes between the branches).
See generally WILKINSON, supra note 15.
See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
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which declined to consider President Obama’s nominees, have persistently
lauded “originalist” understandings of constitutional text and have eulogized
Justice Scalia as a proponent of that modality of interpretation.72
For those reasons, and because the drafters, explicators, opponents, and
ratifiers of the Constitution did describe, sometimes at length, their
understandings of how judicial selection would function under the words of
the Appointments Clause, this inquiry would be incomplete without
considering that record. To be clear, however, the plain-text analysis
presented in Part II above has been conducted independently of any
evidence of the Framers’ intent or contemporary understandings of that text
in the founding era. Founding-era understandings are thus offered as
confirmatory of, rather than necessary to, that analysis.
Nonetheless, the following review of that evidence does suggest that the
Framers intended the words to be understood as they have been semantically
constructed above.
That evidence also suggests some additional
constitutional constraints on the Senate’s exercise of their advice and consent
role. Specifically, the Framers of Article II, Section 2, both those advocating
and opposing its ultimate ratification, universally thought that the selection
process for the Supreme Court should focus on the nominee’s qualifications
for the post. And, prominent advocates for ratification—and founding-era
constitutional scholars—identified the President’s implicit power of serial
nomination as a check on Senate arbitrariness in the conduct of its advice
and consent role. At minimum, those features of our nation’s intellectual
history should receive careful review by any Senator claiming fidelity to the
“original” intentions of our nation’s founders.

72

See, e.g., Prepared Floor Statement, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, Justice Antonin Scalia and His
Role in Protecting Individual Liberties (Feb. 22, 2016) (“He focused legal argument on text and
original understand[ing] rather than a judge’s own views of changing times. . . . Justice Scalia’s role
as a textualist and an originalist was vital to his voting so frequently in favor of constitutional
liberties.”); Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, Hatch Statement on the Passing of Justice
Antonin Scalia (Feb. 16, 2016) (“As a scholar and a jurist, he led a much-needed revolution in the
law, based on the enduring principle that the role of a judge is to say what the law is, not what the
law should be.”); Press Release, Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator & Majority Leader, Justice
Antonin Scalia (Feb. 13, 2016) (“[T]his giant of American jurisprudence almost singlehandedly
revived an approach to constitutional interpretation that prioritized the text and original meaning
of the Constitution.”).
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III. FOUNDING-ERA UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE APPOINTMENTS
CLAUSE73
As explained, the words of the Constitution articulate a design for the
appointment process at odds with the 114th Senate’s broad claim of
authority over that process. The preceding analysis includes conclusions
about constitutional purposes evident from its unadorned text: the
Nominations Clause identifies the Presidency as the superior institution to
select a candidate for the Supreme Court. And, the mandatory language of
the Appointments Clause seeks to ensure that important governmental posts
be filled. The text also insists that the posts be filled promptly, a point
established by the Recess Appointments Clause. Those purposes each
implicitly pursue government functionality or, in the parlance of the
founding era, governmental “vigour.”74
Although the Court’s interpretive framework in Noel Canning gave
primacy to the guidance provided by the unvarnished constitutional text,
including the purposes manifest by its words, it also sought to further clarify
constitutional purposes, when necessary, by considering the Founders’
contemporaneous understandings of that text. For example, before further
analyzing the Recess Appointments Clause, the Court articulated the broad
purposes of that clause with reference to Alexander Hamilton’s explication
of those goals in Federalist No. 76.75 It also relied on “the Founders’” use of
the word “recess” during the Constitutional Convention and Hamilton’s
assumptions about the expected length of a Senate session to resolve whether
that term referred to intra-session recesses as well as inter-session recesses.76

73
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As noted above, the author recognizes the hazards of relying exclusively on original understandings
of constitutional text to resolve a constitutional question. This Article nonetheless conducts such a
review to conform to the interpretive approach conducted by the Court in Noel Canning and to
confirm that the foregoing textual discussion—which does not depend upon any original
understandings of the text—in fact conforms to those understandings. See KATZMANN, supra note
18, at 19 (finding utility in legislative history to confirm or reinforce a court’s understanding of text).
Finally, one may recognize the limitations of complete dependence on an originalist modality for
constitutional interpretation without claiming that founding-era understandings of the text are
useless. For example, original understandings of constitutional design might carry special
interpretive weight when those understandings were shared unanimously in the era.
In Noel Canning, the majority construed the Constitution generally, and the Recess Appointments
Clause, specifically, as provisions designed to foster the “vigour of government.” NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton)).
Id. at 2558–59.
Id. at 2561–62, 2566.
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The Court presumably referred to such sources, the record of the
Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers, because those sources
provide insight into founding-era understandings of constitutional meaning.
The former provides the best historical evidence of the Framers’ intent
contemporaneous to drafting the Constitution. The latter represents the most
prominent public effort, by Framers and Federalists, to explicate the virtues
of that document and thereby endorse it for ratification by the States.77
At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates debated which
institution, the “executive” or the legislature, should be empowered to
appoint judges. In that debate, they focused on which of those branches
could be most trusted to elevate a candidate’s qualifications over partisan,
geographic, or personal interests. When the Convention first addressed the
topic on June 5, 1787, James Madison recorded the opening statement by
James Wilson of Pennsylvania:
Mr. Wilson opposed the appointmt [sic] (of Judges by the) national Legisl:
Experience shewed [sic] the impropriety of such appointmts. by numerous
bodies.
Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary
consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers
might be appointed by a single, responsible person.78

Madison agreed, and recorded his own thoughts, presented on the
Convention Floor, as follows: “Mr. Madison disliked the election of the
Judges by the Legislature or any numerous body. Besides, the danger of
intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite
qualifications.”79 Delegates Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts and
Edmund Randolph of Virginia echoed the preference for executive authority
over appointments. Gorham observed that the “[e]xecutive would . . . be
more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one
would fall on him alone.”80 Randolph argued from his experience that
“[a]ppointments by the Legislatures have generally resulted from cabal, from
personal regard, or some other consideration than a title derived from the
proper qualifications.”81
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James Madison, albeit one of its authors, described the Federalist Papers to Thomas Jefferson as
“the most authentic exposition of the text of the federal Constitution, as understood by the Body
which prepared & the Authority which accepted it.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 218 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
Notes of James Madison (June 5, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
Id. at 120.
Notes of James Madison (July 18, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS at 43.
Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS at 81.
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Several delegates countered that the legislative branch should wield the
appointment power. But even they anchored their arguments, in part, on
the suitability of that institution in choosing the appointees with the best
qualifications. Luther Martin of Maryland maintained that the Senate would
be a better institution for identifying the most “fit” persons for the court
because that institution was “taken from all the States” and would therefore
be “best informed” of the candidates for the job.82 Roger Sherman and
Elbridge Gerry each emphasized the same point.83 Oliver Ellsworth worried
that the President’s stationary location—as distinguished from the Senate
whose members would travel to their home states—would make the
President “more open to caresses & intrigues than the Senate.”84 Of course,
worries about consolidating too much power in the Executive also were also
prevalent among that contingent.85
Benjamin Franklin, who fell initially into neither camp, advocated for a
process that would produce the most qualified candidates. Franklin invited the
Convention to consider what other institutions, beyond the executive and the
legislature, might be empowered to appoint judges. According to Madison’s
notes, Franklin suggested in a “brief and entertaining manner” that fellow
“Lawyers” should select jurists because in Scotland they “always selected the
ablest of the profession in order to . . . share his practice (among themselves).”86
But, as we know from the finished document, those contending that the
Presidency was the institution most capable of identifying the most qualified
candidates prevailed; Article II gave the President the power to both
nominate and appoint. It expressly gave the Senate only the power to
counsel the President on his selections and either grant or withhold consent
to them. Notably, the initial draft presented to the Convention had
empowered the “National Legislature” to choose the newly established
“National Judiciary.”87 And many delegates opposed shifting the
nomination power to the President. But, as seen, even those delegates
assumed that a primary goal of any constitutional design was to secure the
appointment of judges based on their qualifications rather than on other selfinterested motivations.
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Notes of James Madison (July 18, 1787), supra note 80, at 41.
Id. at 41, 43 (Sherman); Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 80 (Gerry).
Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 81.
Id. at 81, 83 (George Mason: “He [Mason] considered the appointment by the Executive as a dangerous
prerogative.” Ellsworth: “The Executive will be regarded by the people with a jealous eye.”).
Notes of James Madison (June 5, 1787), supra note 78, at 119.
Id.
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In Federalist No. 76, Alexander Hamilton defended Article II’s
endowment of nomination authority to the President. In so doing, he
presumably sought to address the concerns of his audience: those considering
whether the Constitution should be ratified. Paralleling the focus of both
factions at the Convention, Hamilton accepted that the institution best suited
to select Supreme Court justices would be the one that could be most trusted
to elevate qualifications above “partialities.”88 Hamilton advocated for the
Presidency as the institution best suited to select qualified candidates because
the “sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a
livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”89 In articulating
the deficiencies of the legislative branch, he observed:
[I]n every exercise of the power of appointing offices by an assembly of men
we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and
dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are
felt by those who compose the assembly. . . . [T]he intrinsic merit of the
candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best
adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party will be more considered than
those which fit the person for the station. . . . And it will rarely happen that
the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of
party victories or of party negotiations.90

Thus, he maintained that the constitutional text, by removing the Senate
from the nomination process, would prevent a regime where partisan
considerations would prevail over a candidate’s fitness for the post.
It is also clear that the President’s nomination authority was understood
by both its advocates and opponents as an important, exclusive power.
Although Oliver Ellsworth argued that the nomination and appointment
power should reside exclusively in the Senate, he recognized that giving the
executive branch nomination authority, subject only to Senate veto, would
mean that the President retained functional control over selection. He
warned: “A nomination under such circumstances will be equivalent to an
appointment.”91 Luther Martin later complained that the President’s power
to nominate was tantamount to the power of appointment, stating it gave
88
89
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
Id. Although organized political parties had not yet emerged, the Constitution’s architects
recognized both the inevitability and dangers of factionalism to governmental function. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 88, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A firm Union will be of the utmost
moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction . . . .”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 88, at 122 (James Madison) (“Among the numerous advantages
promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its
tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 88, at 429.
Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 81.
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him “a power and influence, which together with the other powers . . . would
place him above all restraint and controul [sic]” and make him “a KING, in
everything but the name.”92 In evaluating an earlier Convention proposal
essentially identical in language to that eventually adopted by Article II,
George Mason opined that such a design—providing exclusive power of
nomination to the President with a Senate power to veto any nominee—
“substantially vested” the appointment power in the President “alone.”93
Although opponents complained that Article II’s language made the
power of nomination an exclusive prerogative of the President under the
terms of Article II, Hamilton, a prominent advocate, agreed. While
describing the President’s contemplated authority under that article,
Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 76 that: “In the act of nomination his
judgment alone would be exercised.”94 In Federalist No. 77, Hamilton
compared the Constitution’s design to New York’s own state process and
observed: “In that plan [the Constitution’s] power of nomination is
unequivocally vested in the executive.”95
After ratification, the newly formed Senate debated which branch held
the power to remove officers, a question not addressed in Article II.
According to John Adams’s notes, two Senators commented that the
President should have such power because the Constitution essentially gave
the President the power to appoint. Senator Ellsworth, a former opponent
of that presidential power, stated: “The President, not the Senate, appoint
[sic]; they only consent and advise.”96 And, Senator Read likewise construed
Article II primarily vesting the power of appointment in the President. “It is
not an equal sharing of the power of appointment between the President and
the Senate,” he observed.97 “The Senate are only a check to prevent
impositions on the President.”98
In his commentary on the powers conferred by Article II, Justice Story
expressed this prevailing understanding: “The president is to nominate, and
thereby has the sole power to select for office.”99 In the context of diplomatic
appointments, Thomas Jefferson tersely summarized his understanding of
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland (Nov. 29, 1787), in IV THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 27, 67 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
Notes of James Madison (July 21, 1787), supra note 81, at 83.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 88, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 88, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton).
JOHN ADAMS, Notes of a Debate in the Senate, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 407, 409 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1851).
Id. at 411–12.
Id. at 412.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 376 (1833).
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the extent of the Senate’s advice and consent power as follows: “They are
only to see that no unfit person be employed.”100 As part of the same dispute,
President George Washington accepted the counsel of James Madison, John
Jay, and Thomas Jefferson that the Senate’s advice and consent authority
was limited to the power of “approbation or disapprobation of the person
nominated by the President, all the rest being Executive and vested in the
President by the Constitution.”101
In short, the Constitution’s framers, including proponents and opponents
of the ultimate language set forth in Article II, strove to design an
appointment process that would best elevate the candidate’s qualifications
above partisan interests. The majority of that body deliberately chose the
Presidency over the Senate as the superior institution to effectuate that goal.
For this reason, both the proponents and opponents of so empowering the
executive branch understood that Article II was not contemplated to provide
equal power to the Senate in either the nomination decision specifically or
the appointment process as a whole. Our nation’s most prominent
governmental architects, including Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington, all read Article II,
Section 2 in this way. Any construction of the Advice and Consent Clause
that would entitle the Senate to choose which judicial nominees it would
consider, and thereby capture a concurrent power over nomination itself,
and which could fully negate an individual President’s ability to appoint,
would not be consistent with founding-era understandings of that text. And
the further premise—that the Senate might insist that the President’s
nomination authority be subject to ideological review by voters in an
intervening election—would have been squarely at odds with the Framers’
unanimous intent to design an appointment system focused only on
qualifications and resistant to factional political influence.
The founding-era record also suggests that the Appointments Clause was
understood to include express and implied procedural checks on both the
President and the Senate. Of course, the President’s textually exclusive
powers to nominate and appoint describe express limitations on Senate
authority. Meanwhile, the Senate’s power to withhold consent stands as the
lone textual limitation on a President’s discretion in appointing judges. But
important founding-era constitutional theorists also contemplated how these
respective checks would function in practice.
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Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 30 NOVEMBER 1789–4 JULY 1790, at 379 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961).
GEORGE WASHINGTON, Diary Entry of Tuesday, 27th (April 27, 1790), in THE DIARY OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, FROM 1789 TO 1791, at 128 (Benson J. Lossing ed., 1861).
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In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton explained that the President’s power to
nominate, and the Senate’s duty to consider the nominee, stood central to
the separation of powers calibration. Hamilton dismissed concerns that the
Senate’s “consent” power might allow that body to assume ultimate control
over judicial appointments. He observed that “[t]he Senate could not be
tempted by the preference . . . to reject the one proposed[ ] [by the President]
because they could not assure themselves that the person they might wish
would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination.”102
Of course, Hamilton’s above notion assumes a Senate that will actually
consider the merits of nominated candidates.
As Hamilton explained, the political enforcement of checks and balances
would occur through the faithful discharge of the consideration process itself.
That process would assure that: “The blame of a bad nomination would fall
upon the President singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good
one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate, aggravated by the
consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the
executive.”103 Hamilton contemplated the President’s power to nominate,
and the Senate’s concomitant duty to consider any nominee, as necessary
checks to prevent the Senate from securing functional control over the
appointment process.
Joseph Story, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1811 to
1845, and an early scholar on the meaning of the new Constitution, sought
in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, to “bring[ ] before the
reader the true view of [the Constitution’s] powers, maintained by its
founders and friends.”104 Therein, he analyzed the respective powers of the
Chief Executive and the Senate in the appointment process. He specifically
explained how the appointment process was understood to function when
the Senate rejected a nominee: “[I]n case of a rejection, the most that, can
be said, is, that he [the President] had not his first choice. He will still have
a wide range of selection; and his responsibility to present another candidate,
entirely qualified for the office, will be complete and unquestionable.”105
That the Senate would be duty-bound to consider the President’s nominee is
implicit in Story’s functional understanding of the text. If, instead, the Senate
were permitted to refuse to consider any nominee, the President’s duty to
present another candidate would not be “complete and unquestionable” but
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 88, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 88, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton).
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES viii
(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873).
3 STORY, supra note 99, at 377.
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rather irrelevant and non-existent.
Nor did Story envision any risk of dysfunction presented by the Senate’s
advice and consent power. In his view, the consideration process would
subject the Senate to public scorn if it rejected a qualified candidate:
Nor is it to be expected, that the senate will ordinarily fail of ratifying the
appointment of a suitable person for the office. Independent of the desire,
which such a body may naturally be presumed to feel, of having offices
suitably filled . . . there will be a responsibility to public opinion for a
rejection, which will overcome all common private wishes.106

But the Senate would be shielded from the scorn arising from rejecting a
“suitable person” if it refuses to consider any nominee and claims, as it did
with respect to Judge Garland, that such refusal has nothing to do with the
nominee’s qualifications.
Story understood Article II to be energized by the mutual duties imposed
on the President and the Senate. In explaining why the Senate would not
predictably succumb to a President’s political pressure to appoint unfit
nominees, Story expressed confidence that the senators’ sense of “duty to
their country” would encourage the “firm discharge of their duty [to provide
advice and consent] on such occasions.”107 He explained why the Senate
could not exert undue influence over the President: “It is certain, that the
senate cannot, by their refusal to confirm the nominations of the president,
prevent him from the proper discharge of his duty.”108 But, if the Senate
need not consider the President’s nominees at all as the 114th Senate
claimed, they could—and did—achieve precisely that.
Read together, Hamilton and Story’s assumptions about how the
contemplated checks on Senate authority over appointments would function
all presuppose that Article II imposes an obligation on the Senate to consider
a President’s individual nominees to assess their qualifications. This is so
whether the check is enforced by the President’s ability to serially nominate
candidates, by the leverage of the public opinion when a qualified candidate
is rejected, or by the assumption that both branches possess a duty to execute
the purposes of the Appointments Clause.
In addressing a novel constitutional dispute about the mechanics of
diplomatic appointments in 1790, Thomas Jefferson worried that the Senate
might attempt to interfere with the President’s executive management of
appointees by refusing to confirm any nominee whose assignment defied the
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Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 380.
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Senate’s organizational preference:
It may be objected that the Senate may, by continual negatives on the
person, do what amounts to a negative on the grade; and so indirectly defeat
this right of the President. But this would be a breach of trust, an abuse of
the power confided to the Senate, of which that body cannot be supposed
capable.109

Here, Jefferson characterizes the Senate’s use of a de facto power to
persistently withhold consent (“continual negatives on the person”) as “an
abuse of the power” when deployed to capture greater authority than
specified by Article II. Jefferson refers to another express presidential power
to further illustrate the point:
So the President has the power to convoke the legislature; and the Senate
might defeat that power by refusing to come. This equally amounts to a
negative on the power of convoking. Yet nobody will say they possess such
a negative, or would be capable of usurping it by such oblique means. If the
Constitution had meant to give the Senate a negative on the grade or
destination, as well as the person, it would have said so in direct terms, and
not left it to be effected by a sidewind. It could never mean to give them the
use of one power thro[ugh] the abuse of another.110

Thus, Jefferson rejected any construction of the Appointments Clause that
divines Senate authority from the combination of constitutional silence and
de facto procedural leverage. Jefferson understood the Senate’s advice and
consent role to imply no additional power over the appointment process
beyond an evaluation of the nominee’s fitness for the post. In the same
argument, Jefferson describes the Senate’s role as a limited one, specifically,
“to see that no unfit person be employed.”111
Under Jefferson’s view, then, the Senate’s advice and consent role cannot
be construed to imply Senate control over the identity of the nominees who
will be considered, over the timing of the process, or over the identity of the
Presidents who may select nominees. Professor Somin’s suggestion—that the
Senate may functionally capture such dramatic extra-textual authority
because the text fails to expressly prohibit it from doing so—was not a
constitutional construction favored by Thomas Jefferson. As Jefferson
observed, the Constitution does not textually empower the Senate to capture
“one power thro[ugh] the abuse of another.”112 To paraphrase Jefferson’s
view of Senate appointment authority: if the Constitution had been designed
to provide the Senate with such a dominant role over appointments through
109
110
111
112

Jefferson, supra note 100.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id.
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its advice and consent authority, “it would have said so in direct terms.”113
In summary, a review of the record of the Constitutional Convention, the
Federalist Papers, and the writings of prominent founding-era scholars
strongly suggest: (1) that the Framers strove to create a process for judicial
appointment that elevated a candidate’s qualifications for the post above the
self-interest of the selecting body; (2) that the Presidency, rather than the
Senate, was deliberately chosen as the best institution to effectuate that goal;
(3) that the President’s ultimate authority to serially nominate candidates and
the consideration process mandated by “advice and consent” would function
as a necessary counterweight to a Senate’s ability to otherwise capture the
appointment power; and (4) that the Senate’s advice and consent role was
neither understood to compromise the President’s exclusive authority over
selection nor to provide the Senate dominant authority over the appointment
process.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Evaluated by “plain text” standards, the 114th Senate’s refusal to
consider the President’s nominee was a violation of constitutional design: the
Senate’s claim of such authority can neither be harmonized with plain
constitutional directive expressed in Article II, Section 2 or founding-era
understandings of that text. Nonetheless, the Senate’s claim functionally
prevailed, resulting in a dramatic political victory for the Republican Party
that will likely carry substantial long-term implications for the shape of
American jurisprudence.
More troubling yet, this Article demonstrates that, on the question of
whether the Senate possesses some duty to consider a President’s nominees,
the issue does not present a “close case.”
The text of Article II, Section 2 expressly provides the President with the
exclusive authority to nominate candidates. Yet, the 114th Senate captured
an extra-textual power over nomination by claiming it possessed the final
authority to decide who would be considered and under what circumstances.
The text describes an obligatory three-step process for appointing
important governmental officials. The Senate claimed that it owed no duty
to discharge its advice and consent role as to an individual nominee, the
necessary second step in that process.
The text expressly authorizes Presidents to fill government posts when
the Senate is not in session, elevating the value of prompt appointment over
113
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Senate consideration. The Senate claimed the unilateral power to
indefinitely delay appointments by withholding consideration for over a year
and through the changing of elected Senate bodies.
The text locates the Appointments Clause in Article II, Section 2 among
the Constitution’s enumeration of presidential powers and expressly
describes two of the three steps of that process as powers of the President.
The 114th Senate nonetheless viewed itself as broadly empowered to
determine who would be considered (the power of nomination), to enjoy
complete control over the timing of any appointment, and thereby to delay
the appointment process until a subsequent President took power.
The text semantically confines the Senate’s advice and consent authority
to a review of the nominee already chosen by the President. The Senate read
these same eight words as authorizing it to constructively eviscerate an
individual President’s power to effectively nominate at all. Indeed, the text
fails to describe any Senate authority in the appointment context beyond the
Senate’s limited advice and consent role. Yet, the Senate construed this
silence as permission to dominate the appointment process altogether.
The Constitution’s hostility to the Senate’s claim of authority is
confirmed by a review of the record of the Constitutional Convention, the
Federalist Papers, and other writings of influential founding-era
constitutional commentators. Those documents demonstrate that the
Appointments Clause was originally understood in conformity with the
obligatory process that clause describes for filling governmental vacancies.
The Senate’s claim, that it may indefinitely delay and dominate the process,
thereby trivializing an elected President’s role, would have surprised the
architects, promoters, and adopters of the Constitution.
This is because those who drafted, debated, and ratified Article II
believed they had bestowed the primary authority over appointments on the
President. They believed they had provided only a limited veto power to the
Senate. They believed they had endowed the President, not the Senate, with
the exclusive and important prerogative to nominate and appoint. They
believed the Appointments Clause installed inherent limits on the Senate’s
potential abuse of their advice and consent authority. Specifically, they
understood the President’s power to have his nominees serially considered as
an important and necessary check on the Senate. Otherwise, they feared the
Senate might reject qualified nominees out of cynical self-interest—which is
arguably what the 114th Senate did.
In short, the 114th Senate’s claim of authority, to the extent based on
fidelity to the United States Constitution, is not a correct one. A
comprehensive review of Article II, Section 2 demonstrates the Senate’s
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inaction violated both the letter of, and purpose conveyed by, the
Appointments Clause.
Not all constitutional disputes invite a multitude of plausible
constructions. As Jack Balkin observes, it takes little practical or evaluative
judgment to apply Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution.114 That provision
reads: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State.”115 By contrast, reasonable constitutional scholars might
differ on which constitutional principles, and tools of construction, should be
marshalled to define “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Balkin thus draws a distinction among constitutional rules,
standards, and principles—constitutional requirements set forth in different
levels of abstraction—in evaluating the amount of interpretation or
construction necessary to resolve a constitutional question.116
Here, we have scrutinized constitutional text that sets forth a procedural
rule for filling vacancies on the United States Supreme Court: the
Appointments Clause. That language, while subject to more interpretive
leeway than Article I, Section 3, is sufficiently concrete to markedly limit the
range of plausible interpretations of that language. Indeed, this Article
submits that a searching review of the unadorned text of Article II, Section
2, conducted with reference to the full implications of the Senate’s claim of
authority, confirmed by founding-era understandings of that language, can
produce only one plausible verdict: that the Senate’s complete refusal to
consider President Obama’s nominee was an assertion of raw political will in
violation of the Constitution.
But, if a Senate majority has the express constitutional power to
ultimately withhold consent after consideration, does it functionally matter
that the Constitution prohibits the Senate from withholding consideration?
It should. Justice Antonin Scalia, eulogized by contemporary political
conservatives like those in the Senate majority, spent his career maintaining
that rigorous fidelity to constitutional design is necessary to promote
enduring democratic values. As if chiding Senator McConnell from beyond
the grave, Justice Scalia observed: “A system of democratically adopted laws
cannot endure—it makes no sense—without the belief that words convey
discernible meanings and without the commitment of legal arbiters to abide
by those meanings.”117 Notably, the United States Constitution itself, apart
114

115
116
117

See Jack M. Balkin, The Framework Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 251 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcom Thorburn eds.,
2016).
U.S. CONST. art I., § 3.
Balkin, supra note 114, at 251–53.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at xxix.

70

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:1

from the Bill of Rights, contains little substantive law. It is mostly concerned
with establishing a procedural framework for the conduct of a democracy,
with its primary tool the separation of powers. The Senate’s disregard for
that framework—when the partisan stakes were especially high—was a
rejection of the animating premise of that document.
Furthermore, an institutional recognition that the Constitution demands
Senate consideration of nominees would also have concrete effects on the
nomination of federal district and circuit court judges. As to such judges,
both Senate factions have refused to consider nominees for those posts during
the last year of a President’s term. This Article brings the lawfulness of that
practice into question—at least to the extent the processes for those
appointments are viewed as controlled by Article II, Section 2 and to the
extent the Senate has the time remaining in its session to feasibly conduct an
advice and consent process.
Even if one contends that the ultimate enforcer of constitutional fidelity
must be the public, on the battleground of the electoral process, the
Constitution has designed the terms of that engagement. To justify their
refusal to consider any nominee of President Obama, the Senate made the
political claim that it was harnessing a power that the Constitution provided
it, and that it was doing so in a fashion with the most deference to democratic
ideals: let the voters decide in the upcoming election! Setting aside the
question of whether a presidential election can reasonably be viewed as a
referendum on a single judicial appointment, this was a posture the Senate
was not constitutionally entitled to strike.
In essence, the Senate made a claim of fidelity to democratic ideals when
it was instead violating the Constitution’s rules for conducting our republican
government. While the voting public might not have the patience to parse
the above textual arguments which demonstrate that fact, the names
Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and James
Madison carry considerable prestige among the lay public as arbiters of
constitutional design. Each of them accepted that the Constitution endowed
the President, not the Senate, with the dominant role in selecting and
appointing Justices to the United States Supreme Court. For this reason,
reference to unanimous founding-era understandings of text might plausibly
have elevated the importance of correct constitutional process in the public
mind and intimidated senators seeking re-election to conform to that process.
This was especially so given that Republican Senate leadership had
specifically praised Justice Scalia’s adherence to founding-era understandings
of text in explaining why the process for choosing his replacement should
await an intervening election.
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Let us suppose the 2016 election had occurred with the threshold public
understanding that the Senate’s refusal to consider any nominee of President
Obama’s was a violation of the law or, at minimum, a defiance of our
constitutional Founders’ understandings of separation of powers. Under
such circumstances, any political referendum, especially as to the election of
embattled Republican Senators, might have told a different tale.118 And, in
prospectively contemplating those political risks, those Senators might have
prevailed on their caucus to allow consideration of Judge Garland.
Furthermore, had the Senate abided by constitutional design and
considered President Obama’s nominees, the Senate leadership may not
have been able to control the votes of its caucus. The political calculation of
Republican Senators, especially those facing re-election, may have changed
had they been (1) required to individually reject a moderate and qualified
Justice; (2) after that Justice had been humanized during the theater of public
hearings; and (3) knowing that his rejection would only set the stage for
another confirmation process for another nominee: one perhaps hailing from
the Senator’s home state with a compelling personal narrative.119
The above reputational pressures on individual Senators were the very
checks that Alexander Hamilton and Justice Story envisioned as necessary to
prevent the rejection of qualified nominees on inappropriate partisan
grounds. In this way, correct understandings of constitutional mandates
place political actions in appropriate context. The constitutional procedure
at issue here, carefully devised to balance government function with checks
on power, was designed to do precisely that.
Although the results of this analysis may place the actions of the 114th
Senate in harsh light, this article’s interpretive framework—an evaluation of
the instant constitutional problem with primary reference to a semantic
analysis of the text—conforms to the interpretive approach fervently
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preached by Justice Scalia and for which he was eulogized by the leadership
of that Senate. However, the author has not chosen those interpretive tools
here primarily to expose political hypocrisy.
Instead, the foregoing analysis seeks terra firma. Acknowledging the
primacy of the text offends no prevailing modality of constitutional
interpretation. Indeed, the competing theories of construction become
relevant only when such language fails to resolve a constitutional question.
For this reason, when we strive to identify indisputable semantic
understandings of constitutional text, we stand on neutral interpretive turf.
Such conclusions from text, in those cases when they are available and
discernible, have the potential to provide the concrete constitutional rules
that are necessary for our democracy to function—even when the political
motivation to evade them is especially acute.

